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Abstract
Once we have partial knowledge, what next question do we usually
pursue? Empirical study shows, e.g., that if we know that A ∨ B is true,
but we do not know whether A is true or B is true, then the usual next
step is to ask whether A is true or B is true. This selection of the next
step is in line with the constructive approach to knowledge, in which when
A ∨ B is true, this means that we either know that A is true, or we know
that B is true. In this paper, we provide a possible explanation for this
empirical selection of the future question-to-ask.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Question-based reasoning: a brief description. On each stage of our
knowledge, many things are still unknown. There are many open questions that
we can ask, many directions to pursue. Based on what we know so far, we select
a question to pursue first. This is how we gain knowledge.
Which of the possible questions do we usually pursue? Which questions
should we pursue? The corresponding field of study is known as question-based
reasoning; see, e.g., [4, 5].
Empirical fact. One of the discoveries of research in question-based reasoning
was that, if we know that A ∨ B is true, but we do not know whether A is true
or B is true, then most people start checking whether A is true or B is true.
How this is related to constructive mathematics and constructive
logic. One can see that this usual selection of the next question is related
to constructive approach in mathematics. To explain this relation, let us recall
what this constructive approach is about.
In the traditional mathematics, if we prove that there exists an object that
satisfied a given property, this does not mean that we actually know an example
of such an object – the proof can be by reduction to contradiction. Similarly,
1

if we know that the statement A ∨ B is true, this does not necessarily mean
that we know which of the two statements A and B is true. For example, for
each statement A, we know that A ∨ ¬A is true, but we do not necessarily know
whether A is true or its negation is true.
In practice, we often need to know the object satisfying the given property.
To formalize this need, mathematicians invented the notions of constructive logic
and constructive mathematics; see, e.g., [1, 2, 6]. In constructive mathematics,
∃x P (x) means that we actually know an object that satisfies the property P (x)
– to be more precise, we know an algorithm for constructing such an object.
Similarly, in constructive mathematics, the truth of a composite statement A∨B
means that we either know A or know B.
From this viewpoint, the above feature of our question-based reasoning can
be naturally reformulated in terms of constructive logic: if it so happens that
our knowledge is not constructive, i.e., that we know that A ∨ B is true but we
do not know whether A is true or B is true, then our next move is to try to
make our knowledge more constructive, by trying to decide whether A is true
or B is true.
How can we explain this empirical fact? In this paper, we provide a
possible explanation for the above empirical fact.

2

Analysis of the Problem and the Resulting
Explanation

General description of the state of knowledge. In general, we have some
elementary (“atomic”) statements S1 , . . . , Sn . From this viewpoint, to fully
describe the state of the world, we need to know the truth values of all n
statements.
For each of n statements, there are two possible cases – when this statement
is true and when this statement is false. If we have two elementary statements
(n = 2), then each situation of truth or falsity of S1 leaves to two different
situations depending on whether S2 is true or not. So, overall, we have 2 · 2 = 22
possible combinations of truth values. Similarly, one can show that in principle,
we can have 2n possible worlds.
When we have some information about the statements Si , then not all worlds
are possible – only the worlds in which our information is true. For example, if
we know that S1 ∨ S2 is true, and we have no information about S3 , then out
of 23 = 8 possible worlds, only the following six worlds are possible:
S1 & S2 & S3 , S1 & S2 & ¬S3 , S1 & ¬S2 & S3 ,
S1 & ¬S2 & ¬S3 , ¬S1 & S2 & S3 , ¬S1 & S2 & ¬S3 .
In general, if we know that S1 ∨ S2 is true, and we have no information about
any other statements S3 , . . . , Sn , then we have 3 · 2n−2 possible worlds: indeed,

2

we have three possible combinations of truth values of S1 and S2 :
S1 & S2 , S1 & ¬S2 , ¬S1 & S2 ;
for each of these three cases, there are 2n−2 possible combinations of truth values
of statements S3 , . . . , Sn .
Possible questions. As we have mentioned, the full description of the world
means describing which of the n elementary statement is true and which is false.
If our knowledge is incomplete, this means that for some of the elementary
statement, we do not know whether they are true or false. In this case, a
reasonable idea is to select one of such elementary statements and start analyzing
whether the selected elementary statement is true or false.
Which of the possible questions should we select? Which of the elementary statements should we select? Acquiring new knowledge is not easy.
Progress is mostly made by small steps – since large steps are difficult to do. It
is therefore reasonable to concentrate on questions which are the easiest to solve
– in the sense that their answer will bring in the smallest amount of information.
How can we gauge this amount? Suppose that in the current state of knowledge, there are N possible worlds. We have no reason to believe that any of
these possible worlds is more probable than others. Thus, it is reasonable to as1
sign to each of these worlds the same probability . For each possible question
N
– i.e., for each question about the statement Si :
• we have Mi worlds in which the i-th elementary statement is true, and
• we have N − Mi worlds in which this statement Si is false.
Mi
. Thus, according to
N
the Shannon’s formula (see, e.g., [3]), the information gained after finding the
answer to the question about Si is equal to

Thus, the probability that Si is true is equal to pi =

Ii = −pi · log2 (pi ) − (1 − pi ) · log2 (1 − pi ).

(1)

We should select the question i for which this amount of information is the
smallest possible.
Let us apply this criterion to the S1 ∨ S2 situation. Let us apply this
criterion to the situation when the only information that we have is that S1 ∨ S2
is true.
If we select the question about Si for any i > 2, then, as one can easily
see, exactly half of the worlds have the property Si . In this case, pi = 1/2, so
log2 (pi ) = −1, and the formula (2) leads to Ii = 1.
On the other hand, if we select the question about S1 (or S2 ), then S1 holds
in 2/3 of the worlds: namely, out of three groups of worlds
S1 & S2 & . . . , S1 & ¬S2 & . . . , ¬S1 & S2 & . . . ,
3

the statement S1 is true in two groups:
S1 & S2 & . . . , S1 & ¬S2 & . . .
In this case,
2
I1 = − · log2
3

 
 
1
2
1
− · log2
.
3
3
3

This value is smaller than 1, since it is well known that Shannon’s entropy
attains its largest value when the probabilities are equal [3], i.e., in this case,
when pi = 1 − pi = 1/2.
Thus, the above minimum-information criterion leads to the selection of the
questions about S1 or S2 – exactly what is empirically observed.
Conclusion. Thus, we have indeed explained the above empirical fact about
how people usually choose future research questions. Since this usual way corresponds to the constructive approach, we have thus indeed explained why
question-based reasoning indeed leads to constructive approach to knowledge.
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